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Critical thinking is considered to be an important competence for students and graduates
of higher education. Yet, it is largely unclear which teaching methods are most effective
in supporting the acquisition of critical thinking skills, especially regarding one important
aspect of critical thinking: avoiding biased reasoning. The present study examined
whether creating desirable difficulties in instruction by prompting students to generate
explanations of a problem-solution to themselves (i.e., self-explaining) is effective for
fostering learning and transfer of unbiased reasoning. Seventy-nine first-year students
of a Dutch Applied University of Sciences were first instructed on two categories of
“heuristics and biases” tasks (syllogism and base-rate or Wason and conjunction).
Thereafter, they practiced these either with (self-explaining condition) or without (no
self-explaining condition) self-explanation prompts that asked them to motivate their
answers. Performance was measured on a pretest, immediate posttest, and delayed
(2 weeks later) posttest on all four task categories, to examine effects on learning
(performance on practiced tasks) and transfer (performance on non-practiced tasks).
Participants’ learning and transfer performance improved to a comparable degree from
pretest to immediate posttest in both conditions, and this higher level of performance
was retained on the delayed posttest. Surprisingly, self-explanation prompts had a
negative effect on posttest performance on practiced tasks when those were Wason
and conjunction tasks, and self-explaining had no effect on transfer performance. These
findings suggest that the benefits of explicit instruction and practice on learning and
transfer of unbiased reasoning cannot be enhanced by increasing the difficulty of the
practice tasks through self-explaining.
Keywords: critical thinking, reasoning, heuristics and biases, instructional design, desirable difficulties, self-
explaining
INTRODUCTION
Fostering students’ critical thinking (CT) skills is an important educational objective, as these
skills are essential for effective communication, reasoning and problem-solving abilities, and
participation in a democratic society (Billings and Roberts, 2014). Therefore, it is alarming
that many higher education students find it hard to think critically; their level of CT is often
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too low (Flores et al., 2012) and CT-skills do not seem to
improve over their college years (e.g., Arum and Roksa, 2011).
As early as 1910, John Dewey described the importance of
critique and stated that everyone needs to engage in CT. A
variety of CT definitions has been suggested since then, the most
accepted definition in the field of educational assessment and
instruction of which has been proposed by an expert Delphi
Panel of the American Philosophical Association (APA; Facione,
1990). They characterized CT as “purposeful, self-regulatory
judgment that results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and
inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, conceptual,
methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations on
which that judgment is based” (Facione, 1990, p. 2). Despite the
variety of definitions of CT and the multitude of components,
there appears to be agreement that one key aspect of CT is
the ability to avoid biases in reasoning and decision-making
(West et al., 2008), which we will refer to as unbiased reasoning
from hereon. Bias is said to occur when a reasoning process
results in a systematic deviation from a norm when choosing
actions or estimating probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974; Stanovich et al., 2016). As biased reasoning can have serious
consequences in situations in both daily life and the complex
professional environments (e.g., economics, law, and medicine)
in which the majority of higher education graduates end up
working, it is essential to teach unbiased reasoning in higher
education (e.g., Koehler et al., 2002; Rachlinski, 2004). However,
it is still largely unclear how unbiased reasoning can be best
taught, and especially how transfer can be fostered; that is, the
ability to apply acquired knowledge and skills to new situations
(e.g., Davies, 2013).
In line with findings of research on teaching CT in general
(e.g., Abrami et al., 2014), previous research on unbiased
reasoning has shown that providing students with explicit
instructions and giving them the opportunity to practice what
has been learned, improves performance on the learned tasks, but
not transfer (e.g., Heijltjes et al., 2014b). This lack of transfer is a
problem, as it is important that students can apply what has been
learned to other situations. According to the desirable difficulties
framework (e.g., Bjork, 1994; Bjork and Bjork, 2011; Soderstrom
and Bjork, 2015; Fyfe and Rittle-Johnson, 2017), long-term
performance and transfer can be enhanced by techniques that
are effortful during learning and may seem to temporarily
hold back performance gains. Conditions that support rapid
improvement of performance (i.e., retrieval strength) often only
support momentary performance gains and do not contribute
to permanent changes needed for learning (Bjork and Bjork,
2011). To enhance long-term retention and transfer of learned
skills, storage strength should be increased by effortful learning
conditions that trigger deep processing (Yan et al., 2016). The
active and deeper processing produced by encountering desirable
difficulties can promote transfer to new situations (cf. germane
load; Soderstrom and Bjork, 2015). If, however, the difficulties
evoke learners to invest additional effort on processes that
are not directly relevant for learning or the learners miss the
relevant knowledge or skills to successfully deal with them,
they become undesirable (McDaniel and Butler, 2010; Metcalfe,
2011).
Although conditions inducing the most immediate and
observable signs of performance improvements are often
preferred by both teachers and learners because they appear to be
effective, it is important for teachers and students alike to search
for conditions that confront students with desirable difficulties
and thereby facilitate learning and transfer (Bjork et al., 2015).
Such conditions include, for example, spacing learning sessions
apart rather than massing them together (i.e., spacing effect),
mixing practice-task categories rather than practicing one task-
category before the next (i.e., interleaving effect), and testing
learning material rather than simply restudying it (i.e., testing
effect; e.g., Weissgerber et al., 2018). Another desirable difficulty
is the active generation of an answer, solution, or procedure
rather than the mere passive reception of it (i.e., generation effect;
for a review see Bertsch et al., 2007). Generative processing of
learning materials requires learners to invest additional effort
on the learning processes and to be actively involved in these
processes, such as encoding and retrieval processes (Yan et al.,
2016). Therefore, generative learning activities contribute to
the connection and entrenchment of new information from
the to-be-learned materials to existing knowledge. As a result,
understanding of the materials is stimulated and is more likely
to be recallable at a later time or in a different context (Slamecka
and Graf, 1978; DeWinstanley and Bjork, 2004; Bjork and Bjork,
2011; Fiorella and Mayer, 2016; McCurdy et al., 2017).
One promising strategy to promote generative learning, and
thus to create desirable difficulty in instruction, is self-explaining
(e.g., Fiorella and Mayer, 2016). Self-explaining involves the
generation of explanations of a problem-solution to oneself
rather than simply answering tasks passively. Indeed self-
explaining has been shown to foster knowledge acquisition and
to promote transfer in a variety of other domains (Lombrozo,
2006; Dunlosky et al., 2013; Wylie and Chi, 2014; Fiorella and
Mayer, 2016; Rittle-Johnson and Loehr, 2017; for reviews see
Bisra et al., 2018), but the effectivity in CT-instruction is not yet
clear. Self-explaining is assumed to lead to the construction of
meaningful knowledge structures (i.e., mindware), by investing
effort in identifying knowledge gaps or faulty mental models
and connecting new information to prior knowledge (e.g., Chi,
2000; Atkinson et al., 2003; Fiorella and Mayer, 2016), and seems
especially effective in domains guided by general underlying
principles (Rittle-Johnson and Loehr, 2017). Moreover, self-
explaining might stimulate students to stop and think about
new problem-solving strategies (Siegler, 2002) with engagement
in more analytical and reflective reasoning, labeled as Type 2
processing, as a result. This type of processing is required to
avoid biases in reasoning and decision-making. Biases often
result from relying on Type 1 processing to solve problems,
which is a relatively effortless, automatic, and intuitive type of
processing. Although Type 1 processing may lead to efficient
decision-making in many routine situations, it may open the
door to errors that could have been prevented by engaging
in Type 2 processing (e.g., Evans, 2008; Stanovich, 2011). As
such, self-explaining might contribute to decoupling prior beliefs
from available evidence, which is an essential aspect of unbiased
reasoning. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the
benefit of self-explaining only applies when students are able
Frontiers in Education | www.frontiersin.org 2 November 2018 | Volume 3 | Article 100
van Peppen et al. Effects of Self-Explaining on Critical Thinking
to provide self-explanations of sufficient quality (Schworm and
Renkl, 2007).
Several studies demonstrated that prompting self-explaining
fostered learning and/or transfer of certain aspects of CT-skills,
such as argumentation (e.g., Schworm and Renkl, 2007), complex
judgments (e.g., Helsdingen et al., 2011), or logical reasoning
(e.g., Berry, 1983). Studies on the effect of self-explanation
prompts on unbiased reasoning (Heijltjes et al., 2014a,b, 2015),
however, showed mixed findings. One study found an effect on
transfer performance on an immediate posttest (Heijltjes et al.,
2014b), but this effect was short-lived (i.e., not retained on a
delayed posttest) and not replicated in other studies (Heijltjes
et al., 2014a, 2015). This lack of (prolonged) effects of self-
explaining might have been due to the nature of the final
tests, which were multiple-choice (MC) answers only. A study
in which students had to motivate their MC-answers suggests
that this might provide a better, more sensitive measure of
the effects of self-explaining on transfer of unbiased reasoning
(Hoogerheide et al., 2014). Therefore, the present study used
MC-plus-motivation tests to investigate whether self-explaining
is effective for fostering learning and transfer of unbiased
reasoning.
Since it seems reasonable to assume, but is as yet unproven,
that increasing the desirable difficulty of learning materials
through self-explaining might foster learning and transfer of
unbiased reasoning, the present study was conducted as part
of an existing critical thinking course (i.e., classroom study)
to examine the usefulness of this desirable difficulty in a real
educational setting. We investigated the effects of self-explaining
during practice with “heuristics and biases tasks” (e.g., Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974) on learning and transfer, as assessed by
final test tasks which required students to motivate their MC-
answers. Based on the literature reviewed above, we hypothesized
that explicit CT-instructions combined with practice on domain-
specific cases would be effective for learning: therefore, we
expect performance gains on practiced tasks from pretest to
posttest as measured by MC-answers (Hypothesis 1). The more
interesting question, however, is whether self-explaining during
practice would lead to higher performance gains on practiced
(i.e., learning; Hypothesis 2a) and non-practiced tasks (i.e.,
transfer; Hypothesis 2b) than not being prompted to self-explain
during practice. As outlined before, we expect that beneficial
effects of self-explaining on performance outcomes are more
likely to be detected when participants are required to motivate
their answer to MC-items. We hypothesized that self-explaining
during practice would lead to higher total posttest scores (i.e.,
MC-plus-motivation) on practiced (i.e., learning; Hypothesis
3a) and non-practiced tasks (i.e., transfer; Hypothesis 3b). We
expected this pattern of results to persist on the delayed posttest.
Furthermore, we explored perceived mental effort investment
in the test items to get more insight into the effects of self-
explaining on learning (Question 4a) and transfer performance
(Question 4b). On the one hand, it can be expected that the
acquisition of knowledge of rules and strategies would lower the
cognitive load imposed by the task, and therefore participants
might have to invest less mental effort on the posttests than on
the pretest (Paas et al., 2003), especially after having engaged in
self-explaining. On the other hand, as both our training-phase
and the self-explanation prompts were designed to provoke Type
2 processing—which is more effortful than Type 1 processing
(Evans, 2011)—participants might have been inclined to invest
more effort on the posttests than on the pretest, especially on
the non-practiced (i.e., transfer) tasks, on which participants had
not acquired any knowledge during instruction. Finally, because
the quality of self-explanations has been shown to be related to
learning and transfer, we explored whether the quality of the self-
explanations on the practice tasks correlated with the immediate
and delayed posttest performance (Question 5).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We created an Open Science Framework (OSF) page for
this project, where all materials, a detailed description of the
procedure, and the dataset of the experiment are provided
(osf.io/85ce9).
Participants and Design
Participants were all first-year “Safety and Security Management”
students of a Dutch University of Applied Sciences (N = 88).
Five participants missed the second session and four participants
failed to complete the experiment due to technical problems.
Therefore, the final sample consisted of 79 students (Mage =
19.16, SD= 1.61; 44males). Because this study took place in a real
educational setting and was part of an existing course, our sample
was limited to the total number of students in this cohort. In
response to a reviewer, we added a power function of our analyses
using the G∗Power software (Faul et al., 2009). The power of our
3 × 2 × 2 Mixed ANOVAs—under a fixed alpha level of 0.05,
with a correlation between measures of 0.3, and with a sample
size of 79—is estimated at 0.36, 0.99, and >0.99 for picking
up a small, medium, and large interaction effect, respectively.
Regarding our 2× 2× 2Mixed ANOVAs, the power is estimated
at 0.32, 0.96, and >0.99 for picking up a small, medium, and
large interaction effect, respectively. The power of our study, thus,
should be sufficient to pick up medium-sized effects, which is in
line with the mean weighted medium effect size of self-explaining
of previous studies as indicated in a recent meta-analysis (Bisra
et al., 2018).
The experiment consisted of four phases: pretest, training-
phase (CT-instructions plus practice), immediate posttest, and
delayed posttest (see Table 1 for an overview). Participants
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: (1)
Self-explaining condition (CT-instructions and CT-practice
with self-explanation prompts; n = 39) and (2) No self-
explaining condition (CT-instructions and CT-practice without
self-explanation prompts; n = 40). Of the four task categories
tested in the pretest and posttests participants received
instruction and practice on two task categories (one involving
statistical and one involving logical reasoning, see section CT-
skills tests). To ensure that any condition effects would not be due
to specific characteristics of the instructed and practiced tasks,
half of the participants in each condition got instruction and
practice on the first logical and the first probabilistic reasoning
task category (i.e., syllogism and base-rate), and the other half
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TABLE 1 | Overview of the study design.
Self-explaining (n = 39) No self-explaining (n = 40)
A (n = 18) B (n = 21) C (n = 22) D (n = 18)
Pretest Syllogism, Wason,
Base-rate, and Conjunction
Syllogism, Wason,
Base-rate, and Conjunction
Syllogism, Wason,
Base-rate, and Conjunction
Syllogism, Wason,
Base-rate, and Conjunction
Training-phase
Instruction and Practice (Version) Syllogism and Base-rate Wason and Conjunction Syllogism and Base-rate Wason and Conjunction
Self-explaining prompts during
practice (Condition)
Yes Yes No No
Immediate posttest Syllogism, Wason,
Base-rate, and Conjunction
Syllogism, Wason,
Base-rate, and Conjunction
Syllogism, Wason,
Base-rate, and Conjunction
Syllogism, Wason,
Base-rate, and Conjunction
Delayed posttest Syllogism, Wason,
Base-rate, and Conjunction
Syllogism, Wason,
Base-rate, and Conjunction
Syllogism, Wason,
Base-rate, and Conjunction
Syllogism, Wason,
Base-rate, and Conjunction
on the second logical and the second probabilistic reasoning task
category (i.e., Wason and conjunction).
Materials
CT-Skills Tests
The pretest consisted of eight classic heuristics and biases tasks
that reflected important aspects of CT across four categories
(i.e., two of each category): (1) Syllogistic Reasoning tasks, which
examine the tendency to be influenced by the believability of
a conclusion when evaluating the logical validity of arguments
(adapted from Evans, 2003); (2) Wason Selection tasks, that
measure the tendency to verify rules rather than to falsify
them (adapted from Stanovich, 2011); (3) Base-rate tasks, which
measure the tendency to overrate individual-case evidence (e.g.,
from personal experience, a single case, or prior beliefs) and
to underrate statistical information (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974; adapted from Fong et al., 1986); and (4) Conjunction tasks,
that measure to what extent people neglect a fundamental rule
in probability theory, that is, the conjunction rule [P(A&B) ≤
P(B)] which states that the probability of Event A and Event
B both occurring must be lower than the probability of Event
A or Event B occurring alone (adapted from Tversky and
Kahneman, 1983). The syllogistic reasoning andWason selection
tasks involve logical reasoning (i.e., Wason selection tasks can
be solved by applying modus ponens and modus tollens from
syllogistic reasoning) and the base-rate and conjunction tasks
involve statistical reasoning (i.e., both require knowledge of
probability and data interpretation).
The content of the surface features (cover stories) of all test
items was adapted to the study domain of the participants. A
multiple-choice format with four answer options was used, with
only one correct answer, except for one base-rate task where two
answers were correct.
The immediate and delayed posttests were parallel versions
of the pretest (i.e., structurally equivalent tasks but with
different surface features). During the posttests, participants were
additionally asked to motivate their MC-answers (“Why is this
answer correct? Explain in steps how you have come to this
answer.”) by typing their motivation in a text entry box below the
MC-question. The posttest items on the practiced task categories
served to assess differences in learning outcomes, whereas
the posttest items on the non-practiced task categories served
to assess transfer performance. The transfer task categories
shared similar features with the learning categories, namely, one
requiring knowledge and rules of logic (i.e., syllogisms rules) and
one requiring knowledge and rules of statistics (i.e., probability
and data interpretation).
CT-Instructions
The text-based CT-instructions consisted of a general instruction
on deductive and inductive reasoning and explicit instructions
on two of the four categories from the pretest, including two
extensive worked examples (of the tasks seen in the pretest) of
each category. Participants received the following hints stating
that the principles used in these tasks can be applied at several
reasoning tasks: “Remember that these reasoning schemes can
be applied in several reasoning tasks” and “Remember that the
correct calculation of probabilities is an important skill that can
be applied in several reasoning tasks.”
CT-Practice
The CT-practice phase consisted of a case (315 words text)—
on a topic that participants might encounter in their working-
life—and four practice problems, two of each of the two task
categories that students were given instructions on. In the
self-explanation condition, participants were exposed to a self-
explanation prompt after each of these tasks in which they were
asked to explain how the answer was obtained: “Why is this
answer correct? Explain in steps how you have come to this
answer.”
Mental Effort
After each test item participants reported howmuchmental effort
they invested in completing that item, on a 9-point rating scale
ranging from (1) very, very low effort to (9) very, very high effort
(Paas, 1992; Paas and Van Merriënboer, 1993).
Procedure
The study was run during the first two lessons of a CT-
course in the Safety and Security Management study program
of an institute of higher professional education and conducted
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in the classroom with an entire class of students present.
Participants signed an informed consent form at the start of
the experiment. All materials were delivered in a computer-
based environment (Qualtrics platform) that was created for
this experiment, except for the paper-based case during the
CT-instructions. The Qualtrics program randomly assigned the
participants to a condition/version. Participants could work at
their own pace, were allowed to use scrap paper while solving the
tasks, and time-on-task was logged during all phases.
The study consisted of two sessions. In session 1 (during
the first lesson of the course, ca. 90min.), participants first
completed the pretest. Subsequently, they had to read the CT-
instructions and the case, followed by the practice problems,
which differed according to the assigned condition/version. At
the end, participants completed the immediate posttest. After
2 weeks, session 2 (during the second lesson of the course, ca.
30min.) was held in which participants completed the delayed
posttest. Invested mental effort was rated after each test item on
all CT-skills tests. Both the teacher and the experiment leader
(first author of this paper) were present during all phases of the
experiment.
Scoring
For selecting a correct MC-answer on the three CT-skills tests,
1 point was assigned, resulting in a maximum MC-score of four
points on the learning (i.e., instructed/practiced task categories)
items and four points on the transfer (i.e., task categories not
instructed/practiced) items on each test. On the immediate and
delayed posttest, participants were additionally asked to motivate
their MC-answers. These motivations were scored based on
a coding scheme that can be found on our OSF page. In
addition to the MC-score (1 point), participants could earn a
maximum of two points per question for the given motivation,
resulting in a maximum total score (MC-plus-motivation) of
three points per item. Because one syllogism task had to be
removed from the tests due to an inconsistent variant in the
delayed posttest (i.e., relatively easier form), participants who
received instructions on the syllogistic reasoning and base-
rate tasks, could attain a maximum total score of nine on the
learning items and 12 on the transfer items on each posttest;
and vice versa for the participants who received instructions
on the Wason and conjunction tasks. For comparability, we
computed percentage scores on the learning and transfer
items instead of total scores. Two raters independently scored
25% of the immediate posttest. The intra-class correlation
coefficient was 0.952 for the learning test items and 0.971
for the transfer test items. Because of these high inter-rater
reliabilities the remainder of the tests was scored by one
rater.
The quality of participants’ explanations was determined on
the basis of the self-explanations given during the practice tasks
with a maximum of two points per task (cf. posttest explanation-
scoring procedure). As there were four practice tasks, the
maximum self-explanation score was eight (ranging from 0 to 8).
Two raters independently scored 25% of the tasks. Because the
inter-rater reliability was high (intra-class correlation coefficient
of 0.899), the remainder of the tasks was scored by one rater.
RESULTS
For all analyses in this paper a p-value of 0.05 was used as
a threshold for statistical significance. Partial eta-squared (η2p)
is reported as a measure of effect size for the ANOVAs, for
which 0.01 is considered small, 0.06 medium, and 0.14 large, and
Cohen’s d is reported for the post-hoc tests, with values of 0.20,
0.50, and 0.80 representing a small, medium, and large effect size
respectively (Cohen, 1988).
Preliminary analyses confirmed that there were no significant
differences between the conditions before the start of the
experiment in educational background, χ²(3) = 2.41, p = 0.493,
gender, χ²(1) = 0.16, p = 0.900, or performance, time-on-task,
and mental effort on the pretest (all Fs < 1, maximum ηp
2
=
0.011). An independent-samples t-test indicated—surprisingly—
that there were no significant differences in time-on-task (in
seconds) spent on practice of the instruction tasks between the
self-explaining condition (M = 409.25, SD = 273.45) and the no
self-explaining condition (M= 404.89, SD= 267.13), t(77)= 0.07,
p= 0.943, d= 0.016.
Test Performance
Data are provided in Table 2 and test statistics in Table 3.
Regarding the version of the instruction, only main effects
of Version or interactions of Version with other factors are
reported. The remaining results are provided in Table 3.
Performance Gains on MC-Answers
To test hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b, two 3 × 2 × 2 Mixed
ANOVAs were conducted with Test Moment (pretest, immediate
posttest, and delayed posttest) as within-subjects factor and
Self-explaining (self-explaining and no self-explaining) and
Version (syllogism and base-rate: SB, and Wason selection and
conjunction: WC) as between-subjects factors.
Test Moment significantly affected learning (i.e., performance
on practiced tasks): performance was lower on the pretest (M
= 40.40, SD = 29.09) than on the immediate posttest (M =
78.06, SD = 26.22), p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.647. Performance on the
immediate posttest did not differ significantly from that on the
delayed posttest (M= 79.54, SD= 25.17), p= 0.611, ηp
2
= 0.003.
Note though, that there was an interaction between Test Moment
and Version; participants who received the SB-version showed
an immediate to delayed posttest performance gain (Mimmediate
= 74.16; Mdelayed = 78.28), whereas the WC-version showed a
slight performance drop (Mimmediate = 82.54; Mdelayed = 81.45);
however, follow-up tests showed that the gain/drop were non-
significant, F(1, 38) = 13.12, p = 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.257; F(1,37) =
0.07, p = 0.794, ηp
2
= 0.002. There was no main effect of Self-
explaining nor an interaction between Test Moment and Self-
explaining, indicating that prompting self-explanations did not
affect learning gains.
There was a main effect of Test Moment on test performance
on transfer (i.e., non-practiced) items. Performance was lower
on the pretest (M = 36.71, SD = 27.07) than on the immediate
posttest (M = 49.37, SD = 30.16), p < 0.001, η2p = 0.169,
which in turn was lower than on the delayed posttest (M =
58.02, SD = 29.07), p = 0.004, η2p = 0.108. There was a main
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TABLE 2 | Means (SD) of Test performance (multiple-choice % score), Test performance (multiple-choice plus motivation % score), and Mental effort (1–9) per Condition
and Version.
Self-explaining No self-explaining
A B Total C D Total
LEARNING ITEMS
Test performance (MC) Pretest 55.56 (28.01) 26.19 (23.02) 39.74 (29.15) 57.58 (25.58) 20.83 (19.65) 41.04 (29.38)
Immediate posttest 74.07 (31.43) 76.19 (26.78) 75.21 (28.64) 74.24 (25.05) 88.89 (19.60) 80.83 (23.66)
Delayed posttest 77.78 (22.87) 72.62 (31.53) 75.00 (27.64) 78.78 (24.22) 90.28 (17.44) 83.96 (21.96)
Test performance (MC-plus-motivation) Immediate posttest 58.64 (23.43) 51.59 (25.77) 54.84 (24.65) 60.61 (20.35) 68.06 (22.55) 63.96 (21.42)
Delayed posttest 62.04 (24.53) 47.22 (26.26) 54.06 (23.39) 59.34 (18.50) 69.44 (20.01) 63.89 (19.61)
Mental effort Pretest 4.30 (1.13) 4.20 (1.27) 4.25 (1.19) 4.52 (1.14) 3.61 (1.10) 4.11 (1.20)
Immediate posttest 3.98 (1.27) 3.68 (1.29) 3.82 (1.27) 4.80 (1.54) 3.18 (1.00) 4.07 (1.54)
Delayed posttest 3.91 (1.24) 4.19 (1.78) 4.05 (1.53) 4.02 (1.42) 3.58 (1.49) 3.58 (1.49)
TRANSFER ITEMS
Test performance (MC) Pretest 25.00 (24.25) 44.44 (30.43) 35.47 (29.10) 29.55 (23.95) 48.15 (23.49) 37.92 (25.24)
Immediate posttest 40.28 (28.62) 46.03 (32.45) 43.38 (30.48) 48.86 (27.25) 62.96 (30.01) 55.21 (29.03)
Delayed posttest 41.67 (30.92) 66.67 (25.82) 55.13 (30.63) 45.45 (25.16) 79.63 (16.72) 60.83 (27.55)
Test performance (MC-plus-motivation) Immediate posttest 22.69 (21.92) 37.30 (27.22) 30.56 (25.68) 26.89 (21.51) 55.86 (23.45) 39.93 (26.49)
Delayed posttest 25.93 (23.55) 45.50 (24.95) 36.47 (25.95) 26.89 (19.23) 61.11 (18.86) 42.29 (25.52)
Mental effort Pretest 4.01 (1.28) 4.20 (1.27) 4.11 (1.26) 4.05 (1.28) 3.61 (1.10) 3.85 (1.21)
Immediate posttest 4.42 (1.40) 4.47 (1.09) 4.44 (1.23) 5.17 (1.41) 4.37 (1.22) 4.81 (1.37)
Delayed posttest 4.53 (1.41) 4.67 (1.69) 4.60 (1.48) 4.45 (1.48) 3.81 (1.56) 4.17 (1.53)
Instructional conditions: Version A and C, instructed on and practiced with syllogistic reasoning and base-rate tasks; Version B and D, instructed on and practiced with Wason and
conjunction tasks.
effect of Version: receiving the WC-version resulted in higher
transfer performance (M= 57.98, SE= 3.46) than the SB-version
(M = 38.47, SE = 3.42), indicating that transfer from WC-
tasks to SB-tasks was higher than from SB-tasks to WC-tasks.
Moreover, there was an interaction between Test Moment and
Version. Follow-up analyses showed an effect of Test Moment
for both the SB-version, F(2, 76) = 10.74, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.220,
and the WC-version, F(2, 74) = 16.58, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.309.
The pretest to immediate posttest performance gain was only
significant for the SB-version, F(1, 38) = 16.32, p = 0.001, η
2
p =
0.300, whereas the immediate to delayed posttest performance
gain was only significant for the WC-version, F(1, 37) = 17.64, p
< 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.323. There was no main effect of Self-explaining
nor a significant interaction between Test Moment and Self-
explaining, indicating that prompting self-explanations did not
affect transfer performance.
Effects of Self-Explaining on Learning Outcomes
(MC-Plus-Motivation)
To test hypothesis 3a, we analyzed the data of the MC-plus-
motivation scores on learning items using a 2 × 2 × 2
Mixed ANOVA with Test Moment (immediate posttest and
delayed posttest) as within-subjects factor and Self-explaining
(self-explaining and no self-explaining) and Version (syllogism
and base-rate: SB, and Wason selection and conjunction:
WC) as between-subjects factors (see Tables 2, 3 for data
and test statistics, respectively). Pretest scores were not
included in this analysis because the pretest only consisted
of MC-questions. There was no main effect of Test Moment.
Self-explaining significantly affected performance on learning
items. Surprisingly, performance was higher in the no self-
explaining condition (M = 64.36, SE = 3.26), compared to
the self-explaining condition (M = 54.87, SE = 3.30). Note
though, that there was an interaction between Self-explaining and
Version. The effect of self-explaining was only found for theWC-
version, F(1,37) = 7.66, p= 0.009, ηp
2
= 0.172; there was no main
effect of self-explaining for the SB-version, F(1,38) = 0.01, p =
0.953, ηp
2
= 0.000.We did not found an interaction between Test
Moment and Self-explaining.
Effects of Self-Explaining on Transfer Performance
(MC-Plus-Motivation)
To test hypothesis 3b, we analyzed the data of the MC-plus-
motivation scores on the transfer items using a 2 × 2 × 2
Mixed ANOVA with Test Moment (immediate posttest and
delayed posttest) as within-subjects factor and Self-explaining
(self-explaining and no self-explaining) and Version (syllogism
and base-rate: SB, and Wason selection and conjunction:
WC) as between-subjects factors (see Tables 2, 3 for data and
test statistics, respectively). There were no main effects of
Test Moment and Self-explaining nor an interaction between
Test Moment and Self-explaining. Collectively, the results on
the transfer items again suggest that transfer occurred to a
comparable extent in the self-explaining condition and the no
self-explaining condition. Note though, that there was a main
effect of version of instruction. In line with the findings on the
MC-scores data, performance was higher for the WC-version (M
= 49.95, SE = 3.31) than the SB-version (M = 25.60, SE = 3.27),
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TABLE 3 | Results Mixed ANOVAs.
Test performance (MC) Test performance (MC-plus-motivation) Mental Effort
ANOVA F-test (df) p-value* ηp
2 F-test (df) p-value* ηp
2 F-test (df) p-value* ηp
2
LEARNING
Test Moment 98.13 (2, 150) <0.001** 0.567 0.01 (1, 75) 0.925 0.000 2.67 (2, 148) 0.073 0.035
Self-explaining 1.21 (1, 75) 0.274 0.016 4.19 (1, 75) 0.044* 0.053 0.57 (1, 74) 0.455 0.008
Version 2.82 (1, 75) 0.097 0.036 0.05 (1, 75) 0.817 0.001 6.46 (1, 74) 0.013* 0.080
Test Moment × Self-explaining 1.57 (2, 150) 0.212 0.020 0.02 (1, 75) 0.903 0.000 2.20 (2, 148) 0.115 0.029
Test Moment × Version 24.53 (2, 150) <0.001** 0.246 0.32 (1, 75) 0.571 0.004 2.03 (2, 148) 0.135 0.027
Self-explaining × Version 0.72 (1, 75) 0.397 0.010 4.52 (1, 75) 0.037* 0.057 5.61 (1, 74) 0.020* 0.070
Test Moment × Self-explaining × Version 1.99 (2, 150) 0.141 0.026 1.34 (1, 75) 0.250 0.018 0.36 (1, 148) 0.697 0.005
TRANSFER
Test Moment 23.36 (2, 150) <0.001** 0.237 3.63 (1, 75) 0.061 0.046 7.03 (1.94, 148.00) 0.001* 0.089
Self-explaining 3.00 (1, 75) 0.088 0.038 1.97 (1, 75) 0.164* 0.025 0.33 (1, 74) 0.565 0.004
Version 16.09 (1, 75) <0.001** 0.177 27.36 (1, 75) <0.001** 0.267 1.10 (1, 74) 0.297 0.015
Test Moment × Self-explaining 0.93 (2, 15) 0.399 0.012 0.50 (1, 75) 0.482 0.007 2.90 (1.94, 148.00) 0.060 0.038
Test Moment × Version 4.81 (2, 150) 0.009* 0.060 1.36 (1, 75) 0.248 0.018 0.27 (1.94, 148.00) 0.760 0.004
Self-explaining × Version 0.33 (1, 75) 0.569 0.004 2.43 (1, 75) 0.124 0.031 2.48 (1, 74) 0.119 0.032
Test Moment × Self-explaining × Version 0.38 (2, 150) 0.682 0.005 0.00 (1, 75) 0.974 0.000 0.06 (1.94, 148.00) 0.939 0.001
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.001.
indicating that transfer was higher when instructed/practiced
with the WC-tasks compared to the SB-tasks.
Mental Effort Investment
Again, data are provided in Table 2 and test statistics in Table 3.
We exploratively analyzed the mental effort data (average mental
effort invested per learning item) using two 3 × 2 × 2 Mixed
ANOVAs with Test Moment (pretest, immediate posttest, and
delayed posttest) as within-subjects factor and Self-explaining
(self-explaining and no self-explaining) and Version (syllogism
and base-rate: SB, and Wason selection and conjunction: WC)
as between-subjects factors (Question 4a and 4b). Regarding
the version of the instruction, only main effects of Version or
interactions of Version with other factors are reported. The
remaining results are available in Table 3. One participant had
more than two missing values and was removed from the
analysis.
There were no main effects of Test Moment or Self-explaining
on effort invested in learning items, nor an interaction between
Test Moment and Self-explaining. Note tough, that there was a
main effect of version of instruction. Less effort investment on
learning items was reported for the WC-version (M = 3.65, SE
= 0.17) than the SB-version (M = 4.52, SE = 0.17). Moreover,
there was an interaction between Self-explaining and Version.
The effect of self-explaining was only found for the WC-version,
F(1,36) = 5.08, p= 0.030, ηp
2
= 0.124; there was no main effect of
self-explaining for the SB-version, F(1,38) = 1.26, p= 0.268, η
2
p =
0.032.
Regarding effort invested in transfer items, Mauchly’s test
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated,
χ
2
(2) = 7.45, p = 0.024, and therefore Huynh-Feldt corrected
tests are reported (ε = 0.95). Mental effort was affected by Test
Moment. Invested mental effort was lower on the pretest (M =
3.98, SE = 0.14) compared to the immediate posttest (M = 4.63,
SE = 0.15), p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.208, which did not differ from
that on the delayed posttest (M = 4.38, SE = 0.17), p = 0.160,
ηp
2
= 0.026. There was no main effect of Self-explaining nor an
interaction between Test Moment and Self-explaining.
Quality of Self-Explanations
Several authors have reported that self-explanations are only
beneficial when the quality of the explanations is sufficient (e.g.,
Schworm and Renkl, 2007). To examine whether we could
corroborate this finding, we conducted an exploratory analysis.
Based on the quality of the self-explanations in the instruction
tasks, we created three groups: (1) highest self-explanation scores
(score ≥ 4; 25% of the total group), (2) scores between 2 and 3
(42% of the total group), and 3) lowest self-explanation scores
(score ≤ 1; 33% of the total group). We examined whether the
quality of the self-explanations was related to performance on
the learning (practiced) items by conducting a Mixed ANOVA
(on participants in the self-explanation condition) with Test
Moment (immediate posttest and delayed posttest) as within-
subjects factor and Quality of Self-explanations (high, medium,
and low) as between-subjects factor. There was no main effect
of Test Moment, F(1,36) = 0.02, p = 0.881, ηp
2
= 0.001, but
there was a main effect of Quality of Self-explanations, F(2, 36)
= 8.79, p = 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.328. The group with the lowest
self-explanation scores performed lower on learning items (M
= 36.86, SE = 5.38) than the group with the medium self-
explanation scores (M = 59.55, SE= 4.85), p< 0.001. The group
with the medium self-explanation scores did not differ from the
group with the highest self-explanation scores (M = 69.17, SE
= 6.13), p = 0.226. No interaction between Test Moment and
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Quality of Self-explanations was found, F(2, 36) = 1.26, p= 0.297,
ηp
2
= 0.056.
A similar mixed ANOVA was conducted to explore whether
the quality of the self-explanations was related to performance
on the transfer (non-practiced) items. There was no main effect
of Test Moment, F(1,36) = 2.73, p = 0.107, ηp
2
= 0.070, no
main effect of Quality of Self-explanations, F(2, 36) = 0.01, p =
0.994, ηp
2
= 0.000, nor an interaction between Test Moment and
Quality of Self-explanations, F(2, 36) = 0.61, p = 0.550, ηp
2
=
0.033.
DISCUSSION
Previous research has shown that creating desirable difficulty
in instruction by having learners generate explanations of
a problem-solution to themselves (i.e., self-explaining) rather
than simply answering tasks passively, is effective to foster
learning and transfer in several domains (Fiorella and Mayer,
2016). Regarding unbiased reasoning, Heijltjes et al. (2014b)
demonstrated that self-explaining during practice had a positive
effect on transfer of unbiased reasoning, but this effect was short-
lived and not replicated in other studies (Heijltjes et al., 2014a,
2015). However, these findings were based on MC-answers only,
and there are indications that effects of self-explaining on transfer
may be detected when more sensitive MC-plus-motivation tests
are used (Hoogerheide et al., 2014). With the present experiment,
we aimed to find out whether instruction followed by self-
explaining during practice with heuristics and biases tasks would
be effective for learning and transfer, using final tests that
required participants to motivate their MC-answers.
Consistent with earlier research, our results corroborate the
idea that explicit CT-instruction combined with practice is
beneficial for learning to avoid biased reasoning (Hypothesis 1),
as we found pretest to immediate posttest gains on practiced
tasks, remaining stable on the delayed posttest after 2 weeks, as
measured by performance on the MC-only questions. This is in
line with the notion that the acquisition of relevant mindware
contributes to an adequate use of Type 2 processing which can
prevent biased reasoning (Stanovich et al., 2008). Contrary to
earlier findings (e.g., Heijltjes et al., 2014b), our experiment
seemed to provide some evidence that these instructions and
practice tasks may also enhance transfer. However, this only
applied to participants who practiced with the syllogism and
base-rate version. For participants who received the other
version, transfer performance gains were reached at a later stage.
As such, this may mean that either transfer was easier from
syllogism and base-rate to Wason and conjunction or, given
that this pattern is not consistent across analyses, that our
findings may reflect non-systematic variance. Another reason
why caution is warranted in interpreting this finding is that the
maximum scores differed per version, which—even though we
used percentage scores—might be an issue for comparability.
As for our main question, we did not find any indications
that prompting self-explanations to increase the difficulty of
the practice tasks had a differential effect—compared to the
control condition—on learning (Hypothesis 2a) or transfer
(Hypothesis 2b) performance gains. Nor did the analyses of
the MC-plus-motivation data show a benefit of prompting self-
explanations during practice for learning (Hypothesis 3a) or
transfer (Hypothesis 3b). Surprisingly, our findings even suggest
that self-explaining during practice may actually be less beneficial
for learning: participants who received self-explanation prompts
benefitted less from the instructions than those who were not
prompted; however, this was only the case for one of the versions,
so again, this finding needs to be interpreted with caution.
The findings of the present study are contrary to previous
studies that demonstrated that self-explaining is effective for
establishing both learning and transfer in a variety of domains
(for a review see Fiorella and Mayer, 2016), but they are in
line with the studies on unbiased reasoning (which assessed
performance only by means of MC-answers) that demonstrated
no positive effects (Heijltjes et al., 2014a, 2015) or only a
short-lived effect of self-explaining on transfer (Heijltjes et al.,
2014b). We did find that learners who gave lower quality self-
explanations also performed worse on the learning items on
the test (Question 5), which seems to corroborate the idea
that a higher quality of self-explanations is related to higher
performance (Schworm and Renkl, 2007), but it is possible that
this finding reflects a priori knowledge or ability difference rather
than an effect of the quality of self-explanations on performance.
Thus, this study (with a more extensive performance measure)
contributes to a small body of evidence that self-explanation
prompts seem to have little or no benefit for acquiring unbiased
reasoning skills.
One possible reason for the lack of a self-explanation
effect could be the fact that the learners did not receive
feedback on their self-explanations given in the practice phase.
Providing feedback after students’ self-explanations could have
contributed to consolidating correct explanations and correcting
or elaborating incorrect or incomplete explanations (e.g., Hattie
and Timperley, 2007), which is of great importance in the domain
of unbiased reasoning—arguably even more so than in other
learning domains.
Another possibility might be that the nature of the tasks
moderates effects of self-explaining. Contrary to previous studies,
transfer on the tasks in the present study relies not only on deep
understanding of the domain-specific knowledge involved in the
task, but also on the ability to inhibit Type 1 processing and
to switch to Type 2 processing. Possibly, prompting students to
self-explain did not provoke the “stop and think” reaction that
was needed for transfer above and beyond what the instructions
already accomplished. Our findings regarding effort investment
support this idea (i.e., higher effort investment on transfer items
on the posttests compared to the pretest in both conditions),
suggesting that our training-phase provoked Type 2 processing,
but there was no (additional) effect of the self-explanation
prompts on effort investment.
A strength of the present study worth mentioning, is that—
contrary to previous studies (e.g., Chi et al., 1994)—both
conditions spent equal time on the practice tasks. Hence, it could
be hypothesized that the beneficial effects of self-explaining in
these studies are not direct but caused by mediation: generating
explanations usually requires more time and spending more
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time on subject matter increases performance. According to
this hypothesis, the effect of self-explaining should disappear
when time-on-task is equated between the conditions. Indeed,
Matthews and Rittle-Johnson (2009) observed that solving
tasks with self-explanations and solving more tasks without
explanations in the same amount of time, resulted in equal final
test performance. However, there are mixed results within the
few studies that equated time-on-task, with some studies finding
beneficial effects of self-explaining, while others did not (e.g.,
De Bruin et al., 2007; Matthews and Rittle-Johnson, 2009; De
Koning et al., 2010; McEldoon et al., 2013) andmost other studies
on self-explaining did not (fully) report time-on-task (see Bisra
et al., 2018). Thus, there is a definite need for more research that
examines the interplay between self-explanation, time-on-task,
and final test performance.
Another possibility why we did not find effects of self-
explaining on learning of unbiased reasoning skills, however, is
that our study was conducted as part of an existing course and
the learning materials were part of the exam. Because of that,
students of the control condition may have imposed desirable
difficulties on themselves, for instance by covertly trying to
come up with explanations for the questions. It seems likely
that students would be more willing to invest effort when
their performance on the learning materials actually matters
(intrinsically or extrinsically) for them, which is often the case
in field experiments conducted in real classrooms where the
learning materials are related to the students’ study domain.
Therefore, it is possible that effects of desirable difficulties
such as self-explaining found in the psychological laboratory—
where students participate to earn required research credits
and the learning materials are not part of their study program
and sometimes even unrelated to their study domain—might
not readily transfer to classroom studies. This would explain
why previous studies, which are mostly laboratory studies,
demonstrated effects of self-explaining and why these effects were
mostly absent and in one case only short-lived in the classroom
studies on unbiased reasoning (e.g., Heijltjes et al., 2014a,b, 2015).
Moreover, this finding suggests a theoretical implication, namely
that beneficial effects of creating desirable difficulty in instruction
might become smaller when the willingness to invest increases
and vice versa.
Future work might investigate why self-explanation prompts
as used in the present study seem to have no additional effect
after instruction and practice and whether strategies to improve
students’ quality of self-explanations would have beneficial effects
on learning, and especially, transfer performance. Enhancing the
quality of the self-explanations could be accomplished by, for
example, providing students with a self-explanation training in
advance, or by providing prompts that include some instructional
assistance (cf. Berthold et al., 2009). Moreover, future research
could investigate via classroom studies whether other desirable
difficulties would be more beneficial for establishing learning
and transfer of unbiased reasoning. In contrast to prompting
self-explanations, other desirable difficulties such as creating task
variability during practice and spacing of learning sessions apart,
may result in beneficial effects since students of the control
conditions cannot impose these desirable difficulties themselves
(e.g., Weissgerber et al., 2018).
To conclude, based on the findings from the present study
in combination with prior studies, prompting to self-explain
during practice does not seem to be promising to enhance
unbiased reasoning skills. This suggests that the nature of the
task may be a boundary condition for effects of self-explaining
on learning and transfer. Moreover, this study raises the question
whether effects of self-explaining depend on the setting of the
study, and thus contribute to knowledge about the usefulness
of desirable difficulties in real educational settings. Considerably
more research is needed to investigate how unbiased reasoning
should be taught and especially how transfer can be fostered. This
is important, because biased reasoning can have huge negative
consequences in situations in both daily life and complex
professional environments.
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